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"You Shall be Holy":
Messianism and the Concept of Morality
in Jewish Law

Ilan Dunsky*
At a time when the law is subject to increasing challenges from
all sides, it is important to examine the underlying philosophy of the
legal institution. In doing so, it is equally important to remember that
the law, as it exists today in Canada, is largely the product ofliberalism,
and though that ideology is very elastic and flexible, there are other ways
of understanding the world and thus the law. This paper will examine
one such alternative: Jewish law, which, though not widespread, has
endured for three and one half thousand years, and which, through its
derivative religions, Christianity and Islam, has had a profound effect on
the thought of a large part of the world.
In discussing Jewish law from the vantage point of the late
Twentieth Century, it is necessary to note that while many of the
concepts in Jewish jurisprudence have parallels in Western legal thought,
there are also many differences. The very concept of 'law' is one such
example, and will be discussed in this paper. Further, the concept of the
state in Western jurisprudence does not really exist at all in Jewish law
and must for the purposes of comparison, be replaced by related concepts
such as community or society.
In addition to these conceptual difficulties, the temporal span of
the subject must be considered. According to most commonly accepted
estimates, the Jews began their recorded history early in the second
millennium B.C.E .. 1 A part of Jewish law thus has its origins in the
middle bronze age. 2 As might be expected, over the course of so many
years, the law underwent an umber of changes. It is therefore inaccurate
to speak of one monolithic corpus of Jewish law. There is an enormous
volume of Jewish law; the law covers such interesting and relevant areas
as human rights and the environment. In a paper of this length it would
be impractical to attempt a synthesis of the subject. Discussion in this
paper will be limited to an examination of two principal assumptions and
beliefs underlying Jewish law: the concept of morality and the
relationship between the law and messianism.
Throughout its development, Jewish law has demonstrated a
pre-occupation with morality. It will be shown how this morality has
developed from a narrow concept to a general one, given to increasingly
liberal and humanistic interpretations. The relationship between the
law and messianism, or the idea of human perfection, gives Jewish law
a characteristic which is alien to liberal thought; unlike Western jurisprudence, Jews see the law as an agent of human evolution.
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LAW AND MORALITY
The word 'Bible' comes from the Greek word for book. In Hebrew,
the Bible is known as the Tanach , an acronym derived from the Hebrew
words for its three components, the Pentateuch, Prophets, and Writings.
The initial 'T', the Torah , or Pentateuch, contains the first five books
of the Bible. To Jews it is the most important part of the Bible. According
to the foundation myth of the Jews the Torah was handed down to Moses
at Mount Sinai. It is significant that the word Torah has simply come to
mean 'law' in Hebrew. The concept oflaw has been, and is, central to the
Jewish understanding oflife. It has been suggested that "... few civilizations have been so pre-occupied with law as have the Jews". 3 The study
oflaw is itself, to the Jews, a holy act. There is a legend that even God
spends one quarter of the day studying the law, and another quarter
teaching it to children. 4 The importance of the concept of law to the
Jewish world view is also evidenced in the expression, derived during the
Jewish people's nearly two thousand years of statelessness, that the Jew
is at home wherever there is the Torah .
The centrality of the law in Jewish civilization is related to its
ubiquity in Jewish life. In contrast, the liberal view of the law is
essentially negative; the law serves to control human behaviour, to
prevent Hobbes' "war of every man against every man", or Locke's poor
state of nature. It serves to protect human life and property so that a
stable society may emerge and enrich itself. Essential though the law
may be to the creation of civil society, to the classical liberal philosophers
it entailed a form of control, a restraint of freedom necessary to limit
what they considered humanity's destructive and violent impulses.
Human nature was not only believed to be fundamentally selfish and
competitive, it was also held to be immutable. Thus the law was not seen
as a positive good in itself, as it had been for example by Plato, but rather
as a regrettably necessary institution. Further, because the law restrains freedom, it was to be limited to regulating only that which was
necessary to establish order and protect industry. 5
In contrast to liberalism, and in agreement with Plato, Judaism
has always considered the law to be a vehicle toward human fulfillment.
It is therefore expansive. In addition to the positivist concept oflaw as
command by the duly constituted ruler backed by sanctions, Jewish
jurisprudence recognizes morality and intellectual and moral progress
as law. Under Judaic law, morality is actionable at law. 6 The law is
a nearly unrestricted term, covering every aspect of human existence,
not merely to secure life and property, but to "oversee the uses to which
both are put". 7 Further, human nature is seen as evolving. The law is,
therefore, not limited to controlling the rougher edges of human behaviour, but exists to change humanity and restructure it along lines of
morality, integrity and fairness. Nor is the goal of the law limited: it is
perfection. It is perhaps the Jews' single greatest contribution to the
world that they developed the concept of one God, representing an
absolute standard of moral and intellectual perfection to which humanity aspires, together with the conviction that humanity could, eventu-
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ally, and with much effort, reach that goal. To the Jews, the law is not
a limiting force, but a liberating one.
As a result of this view, there is a fundamental divergence
between Jewish and liberal jurisprudence. Modern jurisprudence, at
least in its positivist incarnation, allows for the possibility of 'unjust'
laws, which nevertheless create obligations so long as they are promulgated by a legitimate government according to proper procedure. This
is so because positivist jurisprudence does not recognize morality as law,
unless it is expressly made so. This is not an acceptable view in Jewish
jurisprudence; a law is valid only if just, and is only just if it is moral.
Indeed, there is no separation between the two concepts in Jewish
jurisprudential writings:
Judaism regards the law as both the embodiment of the
good ... and the primary method to inculcate it. What
emerges within Judaism is a view of the law that gives it
a central role in both defining the content of morality and
infusing it into human behaviour. 8

It is not the legitimacy of the government, nor the procedure followed,
nor the sanction attached thereto, which creates the obligation, but the
existence of a moral imperative. Without this imperative, there is no
obligation to obey beyond the 'mere' avoidance of a sanction or force.
According to Judaism, an unjust law is no law at all. This fusion oflaw
with morality has the interesting effect that, unlike under the common
law, ignorance of the law constitutes a valid defence to a criminal charge.
An act is generally not considered immoral unless it is done with an
immoral intention.
It follows logically that Judaism recognizes the legitimacy of
civil disobedience and, in fact, considers civil disobedience to be an
obligation in the face of an unjust law. 9 The Bible applauds civil
disobedience in several instances, and there are reports by both
Josephus and Philo of Alexandria of 10 000 Jews staging a 'sit-in' on the
road from Acre to Jerusalem in 41 C.E. to prevent statues of the Roman
Emperor Caligula from being installed in the Temple. Incidentally, this
episode provides an example of a success for Jewish law; the Roman
commander, Petronius, turned his men back rather than order a slaughter. 10
The commitment to morality went so far as to admit of situations
where even the Jewish law, which itself defined morality, could be
broken to ensure an even greater moral act. The saving of life, for
instance, ranks higher than any other law, with the exception of those
prohibiting murder, adultery, incest and idolatry. Any law outside of
those four could be broken in order to save a life. 11 Similarly, civil
disobedience, to the point of risking death, was permitted only to protest
laws violating the prohibition of murder, incest and idolatry. 12 The
preservation oflife is considered so important that there is a story that
God grieves over executed murderers, and even over the Egyptian
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soldiers whom He drowned in the Red Sea during the flight of the
Israelites from Egypt.
The view that true justice must be based on morality, and that
morality itself can mean even more than what the Jewish law sets out,
was adopted early on and is included in the Bible. The word 'law' is rarely
used alone. It is usually accompanied by terms such as 'truth' or
'righteousness', which emphasize morality rather than 'black letter'
law. 13 Further,judges were instructed to use equity rather than a strict
application of the law. Maimonides considered literal interpreters of the
law to be "poor in knowledge". 14 In fact, the Talmud considered that
"Jerusalem has fallen (to Rome) because people there adhered strictly
and rigidly to the Torah rules of law and would not act according to the
principles of equity" (emphasis added). 15

SOURCES: NATURAL LAW AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT
Natural Law
It may be surprising, given the emphasis on morality rather
than 'law', that there is a controversy in Jewish jurisprudence over
whether Judaism recognizes a concept of Natural Law, or whether all
morality comes from God and is therefore positive command. To
recognize a role for Natural Law is to allow that there is some law which
exists independently of God, a thought which derogates from God's
omnipotence. For this reason, Maimonides rejected Natural Law as a
source of obligation. However, there is a substantial amount of evidence
supporting the existence of a Jewish Natural Law tradition. Such a
tradition was recognized by both Hugo Grotius and John Selden in the
Seventeenth Century. 16 Both referred to the Noachide Code, a list of
seven commandments given to Noah after the Flood. The first six
commandments prohibited idolatry, blasphemy, murder, adultery, robbery and the eating of a living animal. The seventh ordered the
establishment of a court system.
What removes the Noachide Code from the realm of positive law
is the fact that it is binding on all nations, not only on the Jews. This is
not simply because Noah was, in a sense, the second founder of the
human race, but because these rules are held to be deducible from
reason. The Talmud states that, among all commandments, these seven
would have been deduced had they not been commanded.17 For this
reason, of all Judaism's laws, only these are binding despite ignorance
of the law on the part of the offender. 18
Indication of a Natural Law tradition also comes from legend.
For example, Cain is punished for the murder of Abel, a sanction which
pre-dates the promulgation of any law. When Cain asks God whether
he is morally responsible for his brother ("am I my brother's keeper?"),
the answer is clearly "yes". God's reply indicates a morality pre-existing
positive law. Nor is God necessarily exempt from the operation of
Natural Law, at least in general terms. There is a persistent, if
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unorthodox, tradition in Jewish legend of taking God to court for
in]ustices committed in the world. Ezekiel and Job both accuse God of
being unjust and demand that He stop. 19 In a similar manner,
Abraham denies God the right to be unjust, berating Him with the
argument "Shall not the Judge of the Earth dealjustly?"20
The Social Contract
The dominant body ofJewish law is 'Positive' in thrust. The first
corpus of law is contained in the text of the Bible, particularly in the
Torah, which can viewed as the 'constitutional' document of the Jewish
nation. The Torah contains several legal codes, all claiming divine
provenance, but shows unmistakable signs of a distinctly human society
progressing from a "rude and savage" nomadic tribalism to a "refined
and humane" urban civilization. 21
There is a parallel here between the Covenant and the remarkable legal fiction of the social contract. While the two myths are not
identical (one being a covenant between a nation and God, the other
between individuals), they are similar in that they ground the origin of
law in consent, thus giving it a moral force it could not otherwise possess.
The Jewish covenant with God, however, goes far beyond the scope of the
social contract. The liberal social contract entailed a limited cession of
sovereignty from individuals to the state, to the extent necessary for the
maintenance of public order. The Covenant, agreed to at Sinai, when the
Israelites accepted the Torah, represents the voluntary commitment of
a nation to an all-embracing code of behaviour, an absolute standard of
right and wrong. All of Jewish criminal, contract, tort, property, family,
business and religious law (save the Noachide Code, whatever concept
of Natural Law morality is accepted, and the obligation to circumcise
male children), has its origins within the structure of the Covenant.22
Given the breadth of the agreement, the Covenant must be understood
as the adoption of a particular vision of human life and living. It is not
merely a contract. It is "a paradigmatic statement... a world view'',
declaring each covenantor's acceptance that he or she is not an isolated
individual but a participant in a community involving "a whole host of
relationships".23 Each covenantor becomes responsible to the community for her or his actions, not because this is natural, nor because God
commands it, but because each person has voluntarily accepted this
responsibility. It is for this reason that each generation is obliged to act
as though it has itself come out of Egypt and has been present at Sinai;
each generation must symbolically re-commit itself to the Covenant.24
This Weltanschaung is based on a belief which was revolutionary at a time when other cultures fatalistically believed that human life
depended on the whims of capricious gods.25 The covenantal world view
affirms that humanity possesses free will; we have a choice to do good or
evil, to act justly or unjustly, and that these choices matter to other
individuals, and especially to God. What we do and how we behave, is
considered to effect the very moral order of the world. 26 The Covenant
thus represents a view in which human beings are important , both

126

DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES
individually and in the aggregate, in which the purpose oflife is moral
and intellectual progress, and in which the goal of human perfection is
attainable. The Jewish world view rejects both despairing nihilism and
the liberal conception ofhuman beings as essentially atomized individuals. It understands and measures individuals in terms of a series of
relationships - to other individuals and to all of humanity- and sets this
against a vision of humanity perfected by adherence to an absolute
moral order. At the same time, it recognizes the inherent worth of every
individual as the chooser of her or his own destiny. There may be only
one proper way to behave, but every person is free to accept or reject that
path.27
To speak narrowly of a 'proper way to behave' is, however,
somewhat misleading in the context of Jewish law. The Torah obviously
cannot legislate for every conceivable situation. It refers to a great many
specific situations - tradition recognizes 613 - and contains an array of
more general guidelines for moral behaviour. The explicit commandments presumably are those which were considered to be the most
important or the most common. Thus, there are specific orders to give
equal justice to rich and poor, male and female, free person and slave.
Animals and slaves, as well as the free, are to be rested on the Sabbath.
Having escaped from slavery in Egypt, the Israelites came to impose
severe restrictions on that practice. The command to be just to strangers
is emphasized repeatedly. 28 Strict rules of charity are set out (the
Hebrew word for charity shares the same root as that for 'righteousness'). 29 A duty to rescue is set out (in contrast to the principle of
nonfeasance in the common law). 30 Employer/employee relations are
also considered in some detail (an early form oflabour law). 31
The most famous and important of the explicit laws are the Ten
Commandments, which were engraved on Moses' two stone tablets. It
is significant that the first two commandments deal with the existence
of God and the prohibition ofidolatry. As indicated previously, although
the existence of a personal God is stressed throughout the Jewish
tradition, the concept of God also exists to represent the standard of
intellectual and moral perfection to which humanity aspires, and which
the Jews claim as the ultimate end of human existence. Conversely,
paganism and idolatry represent the negation of such a standard and
goal. In Jewish thought they symbolize a world view devoid of meaning
and purpose; they are incapable of inspiring moral progress. 32 In
addition to their literal meaning, the first two commandments are
affirmations of the covenantal view of the world- a sort of constitutional
preamble. The third commandment, to "remember the Sabbath day and
keep it holy", provides for a weekly re-affirmation of the principles upon
which the Covenant is based.
Beyond the Torah's specific commands are provisions such as to
do "what is right and good", or to "pursue justice". 33 These statements
ofintent were later stressed by the Biblical prophets during the era of the
dual monarchy after 925 B.C.E. The prophets emphasized the spirit of
the Covenant, rather than the 'black letter' law (although they sought
to return the nation to the Covenant, not abrogate it).34 The prophet
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Amos declared that God preferred piety to prayer, justice to sacrifice.
This implied adherence to an even higher standard of behaviour and
morality than that called for by the Torah's specific commands- a likely
reason that the prophets were frequently feared and despised by the
kings and the ruling class of the two Israelite Kingdoms. At the same
time the prophets served to remind the nation that the commitment to
morality was permanent: "This is My covenant with them, says the
Lord ... from this time forth and forever". 35
In spite of these reminders, it sometimes seemed as though the
Covenant had been repudiated. In 722 B.C.E., after a three-year siege
of the capital, Samaria, the northern Kingdom oflsrael fell to Assyria,
and its ruling, educated class was deported and lost forever. Although
the southern Kingdom, Judah, survived the Assyrian onslaught, it
experienced increasingly difficult times after 609 B.C.E .. Caught between a temporarily resurgent Egypt and the expanding Babylonian
Empire, the last king of the Davidic dynasty was killed and Jerusalem
was destroyed in 586 B.C.E. The bulk of the population was deported to
Babylon, thus removing the quid pro quo of the Covenant: the
maintenance and protection of the Israelites in their land. The prophet
Habakkuk expressed incomprehension that the Covenant seemed to be
broken, "Yahweh, how long shall I cry for help, and thou wilt not hear?
Or cry to thee, 'violence!', and thou wilt not save?" 36 The prophet
Jeremiah considered that the Covenant had ceased as the Israelites had
"... walked every one after the imagination of his evil heart ... " (he later
relented and promised a return to the Covenant).37
For these reasons when, after only fifty years, the Persians
conquered the Babylonians and allowed the Jews to return to Jerusalem,
it was believed that in gratitude the Covenant should be renewed. The
scribe Ezra edited the various legal and historical books which had
survived, and set out much of what is now the Bible. The Temple was
rebuilt, though on a much smaller scale, and scholars were sent out to
teach the law to the people. The Covenant was accepted by a majority
vote. The people once again bound themselves to it. 38 However, this
time it was interpreted with subtle differences. Increased exposure to
outside influences, and the poverty and political insignificance of the
Jewish vassal province which centered around Jerusalem, led to an
increased emphasis on the individual's, rather than the nation's, place
within the moral order. The Covenant was henceforth to be understood
in a far more personal way than before; the laws considered more
directly binding on every individual person.
The books of Job and Ecclesiastes, showing the influence of
Persian and, especially, Greek thought reflect this change. Both wrestle
with the problems of suffering and the seeming insignificance of
individuals. Both end with an affirmation of a duty to live morally. Job
speaks of God as follows:
(destroying) both the blameless and the wicked.When
disaster brings sudden death, He mocks at the calamity

128

DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES
of the innocent. The Earth is given over into the hands of
the wicked; He covers the face of its judges.39
Nevertheless, Job refuses to "curse God and die". His reason is simply
stated: "I clothed myself in Justice and it suited me" 40. The lesson of
Job is clear: every covenanted individual is responsible for adhering to
the good, despite personal tragedy; every person is responsible for
contributing to moral progress.41 This too is the lesson of Ecclesiastes,
an almost existential book which begins with the possibility that life has
no meaning, but ends affirming that individuals create their own
meaning by making a conscious choice to pursue, or not to pursue, justice
and morality. 42 It is this interpretation of the Covenant, developed
after one period of exile in Babylon, which the Jews carried with them
into their next period of legal development, at the beginning of a far
longer exile.
The Talmudic Period
Concurrent with the Biblical law, there existed a body of 'Oral
Law', or custom, which developed over the centuries. So long as the Jews
were in one area, there was no perceived need to codify this law. Disaster
prompted codification. The Hasmonean Jewish Kingdom (established in
165 B.C.E., after a 'war ofliberation' against the Seleucid Greeks who
had acquired the territory due to Alexander's defeat of Persia) was
destroyed by civil war and Roman occupation by Pompey in 63 B.C.E ..
After a three year revolt from 66-70 C.E., Jerusalem was again destroyed, the second Temple burned down, and the legal academies
restricted. From 132-135 C.E., the Jews staged yet another revolt
against Rome and this resulted in large-scale massacres and deportations.
Jerusalem, renamed, Aelia Capitolina, was forbidden to the Jews.
Under these conditions, it was considered necessary to codify the
law to ensure its survival. An academy was set up in Tiberias to debate
the oral law and interpret it in accordance with both the Covenantal
Code and changed conditions. This was initially done between 90 and
220 C.E. and resulted in a collection known as the Mishna. Between 220
and 500 C.E., further discussions and codification took place in both
Tiberias and in Babylonia (the area known today as Iraq). The codified
deliberations included majority and minority views on each question,
and were recorded in two separate collections called the Jerusalem and
Babylonian Talmuds. They immediately supplanted the Bible as the
principle legal books of the Jews, thus completing a significant shift in
Jewish law away from relative legalism based on divine law, towards a
more liberal interpretation of the law. This was a problem because
Deuteronomy had specifically commanded that no amendments be
made to the law.43 The Talmudic academies solved the problem of
amending the word of God by interpreting archaic provisions out of
existence, and grafting new concepts onto old laws.
There arose a remarkable notion in the Talmudic academies
that human interpretations of the law outweighed divine ones. A story
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in the Babylonian Talmud relates how several Rabbis were arguing over
the correct interpretation of a particular law. One of them finally called
on God to testify in support of his interpretation, to which the others
replied that "the law is not in heaven: it has been handed down to us at
Mount Sinai, and we no longer take notice ofheavenly voices ... decisions
are to be taken by majority vote". 44 This rather aggressive affirmation
of human precedence completed the transformation of the law from a
divine to a human institution which had begun nearly immediately after
Sinai, had gathered pace after the return from Babylon, and, particularly after direct contact with the Greeks, had been established with
Alexander's defeat of Persia. 45
This coup d'etat enabled the Talmudic academies to diminish
the effect of strict law when it was incompatible with equity. They wrote
that "the courts may intercede in instances where the actions of one
party, while superficially legal... border on the callous and inhumane".46
In 'seizing' the ultimate interpretive power, the academies gave courts
the authority to substitute some Biblical commandments for others in
their adjudications. The legal fiction of substitution held, for example,
that a person who acted with humility could be considered as having
performed the sacrifices at the Temple, an act incapable of fulfillment
given the destruction of the Temple. Using the same doctrine the Talmud
equates the honouring of evil with idolatry.4 7 These developments
stressed behaviour over ritual.
Many archaic laws were changed at this time. The death
penalty, specifically mandated in the Torah for thirty-six crimes,
including failure to respect one's parents, was virtually eliminated
through a creative manipulation of the rules of evidence, which required
a nearly impossible combination of proof before allowing a court to
impose it. The Mishna considers it to be a harsh excess for a court to
impose the death penalty, even once in its seven year term. The minority
view goes so far as to suggest that the punishment be meted out" ... every
seventy years". 48 The Lex Talionis,- an eye for an eye, tooth for a toothwhich, ironically, was originally meant to restrict unlimited revenge
feuds, was also believed to be excessive and was reinterpreted to mean
the monetary value of a tooth, eye or life. 49 Without enumerating all
of the changes made to the law during the Talmudic Period, it is
sufficient to stress that as a rule, general principles of morality were
applied to legal cases, so that, in modern terminology, equity became the
rule and strict application of the law the exception. The Talmud approvingly quotes Hillel, considered the greatest Rabbi of all (and, according
to modern scholarship, a possible influence on, if not actual teacher of,
Jesus), 50 as saying that all of Jewish law consists of only one basic rule:
"Do not unto others as you would not have them do unto you: that is the
law. All the rest is explanation". 51

The Post-Talmudic Period: the Commentaries
Since the close of the Talmudic period, change in the law has
been achieved chiefly through the use of 'Commentaries' - scholarly
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explanations of Talmudic and Biblical sources. The Commentaries
continued the movement away from strict application of the law towards
the principles of the Covenant. The Talmud refers to this as reading
"within the line of the law"; what we would today call "reading between
the lines".52 Nachmanides (1194-1270 C.E.) wrote that "... one should
do the right and the good in all matters ... beyond the requirement of the
law".53 The Sixteenth Century Rabbi Joshua Val-Katz went further,
stating that the judge "must not always decide according to strict Torah
law ... (but rather) according to principles of equity". 54
An example of the radical departure from strict Bible law is the
change in the legal position of women. This position was greatly
improved under both the Talmudic and the post-Talmudic regimes,
rising from a position of near-slavery to one closer to, although admittedly not one offull, equality. 55 Under the earliest legal codes, a young
girl was liable to be sold by her father as a slave. In Jewish law the
enslaved daughter had to be freed at puberty and she could not be
maintained in slavery if raped. In the event that she was raped, the
offender was required to marry her. Although these laws had been
abandoned long before the advent of the Talmudic period, the Talmudic
academies nevertheless took steps to provide real protection at law for
women. They instituted marriage contracts between husband and wife,
and provided women with automatic liens on their husbands' estates in
case of divorce. They declared that a man who beat his wife became
liable to her for damages in case 9f injury. Finally, in the Eleventh
Century the commentator Gershom'ofMainz prohibited divorce without
the consent of the woman.56 Though these protections seem weak today,
they compare rather favourably with comparable legal protections
existing at those times in most other societies.
The period of the commentators reached its pinnacle with the
works of Moses Maimonides (1135-1204 C.E.). A philosopher, legal
codifier, scientist, writer and personal physician to Saladin in Cairo,
Maimonides attempted nothing less than the complete harmonization of
Jewish religion and law with the principles ofreason and the philosophy
of Aristotle. 57 He identified reason with morality and law, and saw God
as representing pure reason as well as morality. As he believed that it
was possible for humankind to reach many of the Torah's conclusions
about intellectual progress and morality through reason, he contributed
to Judaism's emphasis on human thought and relations rather than on
divine contemplation. Although Maimonides never minimized the
importance of God as a real being, he nevertheless tended to speak of
"feeding the hungry and clothing the naked" concurrently with, and
sometimes in the same paragraph as, laws concerning religious ritual,
on the grounds that the hungry could not contemplate justice.58 As a
result of his unorthodox methodology he was sometimes accused of
selectively ignoring certain aspects of the law and of inventing
rationalizations with no authorities in support of his contentions. Notwithstanding these accusations, the quality of his work passed into the
canon of Jewish jurisprudence. The importance of his contribution has
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been so great that it is said, "from Moses to Moses, there was none other
like Moses".
APPLICATION OF THE LAW

Law and the Messianic Ideal
It is evident that Jewish law has a far more active role in Jewish
life than is allowed by liberal jurisprudence. As the principal agent of
human progress, the law serves as the link by which human imperfection is divinely perfectible. Joseph Blenkinsopp has suggested that the
entire "... Deuteronomic programme ... (relates) cultic fidelity with the
task of creating a just society" through proper application of Jewish
law. 59
There is also a hierarchy of more limited goals in Jewish law.
The first, intrinsic to whatever concept of Natural Law is accepted,
although not explicit in the Covenant, is the necessary ordering of
human society. This ordering, held to be the result of an innate human
desire for community, is reminiscent of Aristotle. The law creates
conditions in which civilized life is made possible. 60 Historically, these
conditions are situated roughly in the time before the reception of the
Torah at Sinai.
The second stage oflegal development is the ordering of society
"along principles of morality, integrity and fairness". 61 This formulation should be considered in connection with the increasing social and
political reforms characteristic of the period of the Judges (c. 1200-1010
B.C.E.) but more particularly of the Monarchy (c. 1010-586 B.C.E.).
During these stages the full aim of Jewish law becomes apparent. The
religious-legal duty of the Jews is not just to create a more just society,
but to create a perfect one, in other words, to reform the world by
example. This is the meaning of election. Being the 'chosen people'
entails extra obligations, not rights.
It must be emphasized that the Jewish messianic ideal is
fundamentally different from the Christian one; Judaism has no
concept of Original Sin. The Jew, like the Christian, sees humans as
created in the image of God. By having eaten from the 'Tree of
Knowledge' human beings are not, however, born in sin. Rather, we
have obtained a measure of God's intellect. We are therefore considered
to be capable of creation as well as destruction, and of choosing between
the two. This power includes the ability to change, as well as to
transcend human nature. The first act of Creation aside, humans are
deemed to be by themselves capable of continuous re-creation. 62 It is
this ability which renders the moral and intellectual perfection of
humanity possible. What it is essential to remember is that it is
humanity which perfects itself. In the Jewish tradition, the messiah is
a human being, not a divinity, who is to rule on Earth, not in Heaven .
.What emerges from the philosophy underlying Jewish religion
and law is a daring goal ofhomotheosis: humanity becoming like God.
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There is in fact a long tradition in Judaism of competition with God, parts
of which have been alluded to in the discussion above. Indeed, the very
name Israel means "to contend with God". The competition is not meant
to be acrimonious; it is compared to the competition between children
and parents. 63 In fact, the Bible itself commands us to emulate and
attempt to become like God: ''You shall be holy, for I, the Lord thy God,
am holy". 64 The ideal ofhomotheosis is the ultimate goal of Jewish
religion and law: the creation on Earth of a morally and intellectually
perfect, creative humanity, living in a perfectly just society, ruled by a
perfectly just king. 65 The messianic age is therefore not at all a break
with history, it is simply the end result of human evolution, brought
about by adherence to Jewish law.66
The 'State' in Jewish Law
(a) The Legislative Branch: The concept of the State is not fully developed in Jewish law. This may partly be a result of the fact that for
eighteen centuries the Jews had no state of their own. It is also likely
that in the formative period of the Jewish people it would have been
considered presumptuous to install a permanently organized human
government beneath God. The fact that the laws in their origin predated
the state would have served to diffuse any perceived need for a
legislative branch of government. In time this situation changed and a
limited legislative power was granted to the courts, a power rather akin
to the (undeclared) power of common law courts to 'legislate' changes to
the common law. Finally, as discussed previously, a large degree of
legislative power was 'usurped' by the Talmudic academies and their
successors, the Commentators.
(b) The Executive: While it was considered necessary to have a government strong enough to implement the law, the fear was that a strong
executive would be tempted to rule in the manner of a despotic monarch
and would be unconcerned with the law which had been accepted at
Sinai. This tension was manifest in the reluctance of the prophet Samuel
to appoint a king when the people demanded one, and in his eventual
appointment of Saul, who was a shepherd from the smallest and weakest
of the tribes. The reluctance of the Twelve Tribes to unite under a strong
executive monarchy was also the primary reason for the breakup of
David's Israelite Empire after the death of Solomon in 926 B.C.E ..
In order to prevent the emergence of an excessively strong
executive, rules were devised to check the power of the king. This led to
what Chaim Weizman, the first President of the modern state oflsrael,
called "the mother of constitutional government".67 The king, or in
several instances the Queen, was bound to obey the Covenant. Not only
was the sovereign emphatically not above the law, he or she obtained
legitimacy only insofar as he or she upheld and enforced the covenantal
laws and standards. King Solomon is supposed to have declared that
"only by justice is the throne established". 68
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There existed a list oflegal obligations to guide royal action. The
Sovereign must be a "man of the people", refrain from keeping too many
horses, abstain from keeping numerous wives, 69 refrain from accumulating wealth, and read Deuteronomy daily. 70 In addition to legal
checks, the activities of the monarch were to be checked by the the
prophets. The prophets were commanded by law to act as consciences,
or "mirrors to Kings'', praising good acts and publicly criticizing injustice. 71 The moral authority of a constitutional monarch ruling under a
just Constitution (the Torah) was illustrated by the famous Eighteenth
Century Rabbi of Berdichev, Russia, who pointed out that despite a huge
standing army, the living Tsar was unable to prevent smuggling, while
the Jewish law was still respected by Jews despite the fact that Moses
had been dead for three thousand years and the Jews stateless for
seventeen centuries. 72
(c) The Judiciary: The institution of a judiciary is considered of vital
importance in Jewish law, more so than the executive. It is believed to
be so important that it is the seventh and final component of the
Noachide Code, and is thus binding on all humanity. The great
commentator Rashi ( 1040-1105 C.E.) considered that although different
nations established different legal systems, all were required by Natural Law to establish court systems to enforce equitable laws. 73 As noted,
there is little legislative power under Jewish law. It is the courts which,
by and large, fulfill the legislative function. The judiciary in its
application of the law is considered to advance the perfection oflaw. The
Talmud equates judgeship with the human process of self-creation:
"Whoever renders a true and just decision, it is as if he had become a
partner with God in the work of creation". 74
The creation of a sophisticated court system dates to the return
of the Jews to Israel from Babylon in 444 B.C.E .. A Great Sanhedrin of
seventy-one judges sitting in Jerusalem operated as the Supreme Court,
while lesser Sanhedrins were established throughout the countryside
with the jurisdiction of each level clearly defined. In addition to
adjudication and reforming the law, the Great Sanhedrin had supervisory responsibilities. Only it could appoint the King, the High Priest,
and lesser judges. Only it could declare war, barring emergency
situations of self-defence. It was the Great Sanhedrin, then, which
replaced the prophets as the counterweight to the power of the Executive
during the era of the Second Temple.
(d) Enforcement: The fact that Jewish law regulates nearly every aspect
of human life, from the largest moral questions to the minutiae of daily
routine, may render the impression that it tends toward a totalitarian
control of human life. This is not the case. Many aspects of the law are
not meant to be enforced. Apart from the practical impossibility of
enforcement, because the law is equated with morality, it was believed
that an act could only be moral ifit were done voluntarily and out oflove
for the law, rather than out of fear.75 Although this does not apply to
the law as a whole - sanctions are set out for many of the crimes defined
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in the various legal codes - it has consistently been held that certain
aspects of the law should not be enforced at all, including beliefin the law
itself. Unlike in Islam, there is in Judaism no punishment for apostasy.
"There is no catechism in the Judaic tradition, nor is there any inquisition into the content or sincerity of the individual adherent's belief'. 76
Thus, Judaism leaves some matters of morality to the conscience of the
individual. While in the Ninth Century B.C.E., the Chief Temple Priest
Jehoiada set guards at the entrance to the Temple to prevent access to
the 'impure' (unwashed), a Fourth Century scholar cogitates: if"one has
suffered a pollution ... (and) is so minded, he bathes; if he is otherwise
minded, he does not bathe. Does anyone see him, or does anyone know
to tell him he ought?" 77 Similarly, the Sixteenth Century Rabbi, the
Mahalel of Prague, considers the more substantive issue of freedom of
speech, in a manner reminiscent of John Stuart Mill:
Even if one's words are directed against faith and
religion,do not tell a man not to speak ... Otherwise there
will be no clarification ofreligious matters ... One should
tell a person to express whatever he wants. The elimination of the opinions of those opposed to religion undermines religion and weakens it. 78
The lack of enforcement in many areas of the law underlies a
major difference between the Jewish and the liberal conception of'law'.
The liberal view is bound to the concept of rights which are held by
individuals against other individuals and against the state. The state
may not make laws which interfere with these rights, and each individual has a duty not to exercise her or his rights to the detriment of other
individuals. This right/duty dichotomy flows from a political and legal
philosophy which maintains antagonistic views of the relationships
between individuals, and between individuals and the state. This
fosters the liberal notion that a law which is considered binding, is only
law, if it carries with it a sanction for failure to obey.
The dichotomy between rights and duties does not exist in
Jewish law. As indicated previously, a law is considered binding only if
it orders society and contributes to the moral and intellectual progress
of humanity. There is no perceived conflict between law and freedom.
The law is held to lead to human freedom, to a moral and intellectual
perfection approaching Divine stature. Rather than seeking to protect
individuals from one another and from the state, Judaism considers
humanity to be joined in a community of individuals sharing a collection
of interpersonal debts. Jewish law attempts to encourage "impulses to
co-operation and friendship and not... impulses to assert rights, demand
duties, and threaten force." 79 Each person is considered to be an
individual. Each has the free will to cooperate or not to cooperate in the
building of the community, and each is responsible for that choice, both
to the community and to God (or, if one prefers, to the common vision of
what humanity can achieve). 80 In modern terms, Jewish law lies
somewhere between liberalism and corporatism, or communitarianism.
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There is no contradiction, within the Judaic tradition, in the fact that a
law may not be enforced by the state, but may still be binding law.
The emphasis on the community of all humankind is the essential reason for obeying the law. It is not the only reason. At a simple level,
God is said to materially reward those who obey the law. As Meir Tamari
has pointed out, in a religion with only a weak tradition of an afterlife,
the sole external reward for virtue has generally been material wellbeing (although the reward, of course, depends upon God's will). 81
Other reasons for adhering to the law range from the basic need to
maintain order thus making civilized life possible, 82 and to the need to
maintain the hope of progress in an evil world. 83
The Jewish foundational myth of election reinforces the importance of obeying the law. Upon accepting the Covenant, the Jews made
themselves responsible for upholding the law in order to reform the
world by example. Human perfection and the just world are only
possible, though, through the voluntary adherence of individuals to the
law. Every individual's choice to adhere to or disregard the law therefore
effects all humanity. While an individual who chooses to adhere to the
law may not be individually rewarded, humanity as a whole gains.
Conversely, disobedience of the law 'writ large' is a violation of the
covenanted individual's duty to advance the standard of absolute morality. Individuals who choose not to obey the law thereby commit an act
of destruction, setting the world back towards idolatry and anarchy. 84

SIGNIFICANCE OF JEWISH LAW
Jewish law represents a fundamentally different approach to
life and law than does liberalism. It holds that human beings are
possessed of free will, capable of both good and evil. It believes that
humanity is rational and perfectible. It affirms that we cannot conceive
of ourselves solely as individuals or as members of a group if we are to
succeed in the realization of 'world community'. In combination these
tenets represent a cohesive vision which is both optimistic and challenging. The genius of the institution of Jewish law is the flexible means it
has implemented in seeking to achieve its absolute and unchanging goal.
The stress on reasoning and 'principle', as opposed to the 'letter of the
law', has saved Jewish legal thought from stultifying formalism and
irrelevance. It was thus possible for Rabbi Simeon b. Gamaliel to write
of the Talmud that "the world endures by virtue of three things: justice,
peace and truth" 85, without having to fully define just what justice,
peace and truth entailed.
To this writer it appears that Jewish lmv has two advantages
which, paradoxically, are also disadvantages. The first is that for much
of its existence, and for nearly the entire period ofits greatest change and
adaptation, Jewish law did not face the pressure of implementation by
a state. In its first one thousand years, when the Jewish law did exist as
the law of a 'nation-state', it was relatively modern in comparison to
other legal codes of that time. From the Talmudic period onwards, the
law was applied to a relatively small group of people spread throughout
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the area of three, and then six continents. As it did not have to face the
stress of national implementation, it was free to preoccupy itself with
absolute morality. It did not have to expect human beings, with their
weaknesses and appetites, to succeed in adhering totally to the law. In
its broader ambit it emphasized the role of law as a guide to moral
behaviour, rather than detail a complete civil and criminal code. The .
focus of the law became the development and refinement of the means
towards the end of absolute morality. Jewish law seems to have shared
the same attitude that Judaism has always had with regards to the
Messiah: the Messiah will come, certainly, absolutely, but not within
planning range; we had better begin to learn to live together in the
meantime.
The second advantage/disadvantage of Jewish law is that it has
always applied to a small and relatively homogeneous group of people.
When Rabbi Simeon b. Gamaliel refers to the abstract notions ofjustice,
peace and truth, most Jews .in antiquity would have had a shared
understanding of the concepts. The holy days established under Jewish
law reinforce these collective conceptions. Passover, the most significant
holiday in Judaism celebrates the freedom of the Israelites from slavery
and their acceptance of the law. The annual requirement in law that
each Jew recount the story of the Exodus and the reception of the law
strengthens the bonds to the law and to the community. 86 The
disadvantage of this is the reduced applicability of that law to those
outside the group. Ironically, the same elements which bring Jews to
accept their self-imposed duty to the world also mitigate against the
applicability of the covenantal world view beyond the group.
This is not to argue that Jewish law has not had a profound effect
upon the world. Through its derivative religions, Christianity and
Islam, Judaism's moral codes are today applied, to a greater or lesser
degree, over many peoples across the world. Harold Berman and other
legal scholars have documented the debt that modern Western law owes
to religion, specifically to Christianity and through it, to Judaism, for
having provided it with a moral code. Without this, scholars claim,
Western law would have neither authority nor cohesiveness. 87
In the end, however, if Jewish law is to be considered anything
more than a cultural fossil, it must stand on its own rather than be
respected for its contribution to other legal traditions. Jewish law is
possibly the first example of a jurisprudential tradition which does not
accept that human nature is static. Although Plato would concur, his
opinion was 'lost' to Western philosophy until the writings of JeanJacques Rousseau in the Eighteenth Century. A formidable array of
thinkers, from Aristotle onwards, including the classical liberals, held
that human nature was fixed and immutable. While opinions diverged
as to whether that nature is 'good' or 'bad', the notion of immutability
necessarily limited the scope of human action. The belief of liberalism
that human nature will always and fundamentally be self-interested
and competitive is, in essence, a 'fallen vision'. While no one could deny
the indisputable success ofliberalism in influencing Western life, it is
nevertheless true that in its moral outlook, it is rather limited.
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On the other hand, the lasting legacy ofJewish law is the utopian
vision of the perfectly just world. Given the sorry state of human affairs,
particularly in this century, one might conclude that the liberals are
right and that the idea of a just world is a fallacy. However, Judaism's
astounding and unshaken faith, in the face of history's dismal record,
that humanity can reform itself and progress to perfection, and even
homotheosis, remains strong. In an age of nuclear weapons and widespread human persecution the importance of grounding law in morality,
truth, and the pursuit of perfection, both in the individual, but more
importantly in the communal sense, must be reconsidered. It is in many
ways apt that we, as lawyers, remember the words of the long-dead
psalmist, who from a distance of 2, 500 years, tells us with absolute
conviction, that "The law which is perfect, perfects the soul". 88
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